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I. Introduction
In this paper we present an integrated analysis of trade and foreign
investment in the context of a North-South model. Since certain re-
sources are not distributed evenly throughout the world, a significant
portion of foreign investment of the North is directed towards indus-
tries in the South which are extractive or devoted to the production of
raw materials. As noted by Bergsten et. al. [1978] , essential impor-
tance of these raw materials have led the North to adopt three different
strategies in the past; domestic self-sufficiency, colonization and
direct foreign investment. The first was inefficient as these required
large capital outlays, labor was not abundant and lead times for the
development of these resources or their substitutes was long. The
second, colonization, was an international extension of domestic
self-sufficiency and has ceased to be an effective method of control.
As an example, one may cite the extinction of British, French, Dutch and
Portuguese colonies. Instead, direct foreign investment has emerged as
the major instrument through which the North has developed connections
with the South and this is revealed in the activities of the multi-
nationals. Our attempt here is to analyze the effects of commercial
policies and factor accumulation on income distribution, allocation of
resources and welfare in a model which highlights production interdepen-
dence together with dependence through trade.
We divide the world economy into two parts, a capital-rich resource-
poor North and a resource-rich labor surplus South. There are two goods
in the model, a manufactured good and a primary resource. Following our
observation on the unevenness in distribution of resources, we assume
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that the primary resource is produced in the South only. This is an
input in the production of a manufactured good produced both in the
North and in the South. If we assume the South to be an aggregation of
less developed countries (LDCs) , then production of the manufactured
good by the South is natural since with the process of development every
LDC wants to industrialize. We justify our assumption of a specialized
North on the basis of arguments that were provided against domestic
self-sufficiency. Moreover, our assumption of a labor surplus South
makes it profitable for the North to invest in the South as the resource
is available there and labor is cheap.
Recently, Kemp-Ohyama [1978] developed a model of trade between
resource-rich and resource-poor countries where both sets of countries
were completely specialized and conditions in the labor markets of
both countries were not given explicit play. This ruled out any import
substitution by the South and ignored one of the important factors
underlying North's foreign investment, i.e., cheap labor. Our set-up is
thus a generalization of their structure. From the policy point of view
our set-up can additionally analyze the impact of policy measures on
distribution of income between factors of production together with
additional instruments like tariffs conducive to South' s industriali-
zation.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section II describes the
model and presents the basic properties of the equilibrium. Section III
studies the effects of various instruments of commercial policy on
factor rewards, terms of trade, output levels and international
investment. Section IV examines the implications of these results for
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welfare of either country and Section V examines, along the lines of
Jones [1967] and Kemp [1969], commercial policies when either country
has available to it more than one policy instrument. We end the paper
with three concluding remarks.
II. The Model and Basic Properties of Equilibrium
The world economy is divided into two parts, North and South, each
being endowed with positive amounts of capital and labor, i.e., (K*,L*)
and (K,L) respectively. Each country produces a manufactured good u
2
in accordance with a well-behaved, constant returns to scale production
function and using as inputs capital, labor and a primary resource z.
We may thus write
X - F (L ,K ,M ); X = F (L ,K ,M ) (2.1)
u u u u u u u u u u
The primary resource, which is produced only in the South, uses capital
3
and labor as inputs and is produced in accordance with a well-behaved,
constant returns to scale production function, i.e.
X - F (L ,K ) (2.2)
z z z z
The following material balance equations complete the specification of
the real side of our model.
K +K + K =K+K* = k (2.3a)
u u z
(2.3b)
(2.3c)
and the total employment in the South is given by L = L + L
.
e z u
L
u
= L*
M + M
u u
= X
z
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Following Lewis [1954] , we assume that there is surplus labor in
the South at an exogenously given subsistence wage w. We assume w to
be fixed in terms of commodity u which is the only consumable good in
the system. We also assume that labor is internationally immobile
while capital is perfectly mobile and that there is universal marginal
4
productivity pricing. Given competitive markets, it is a well known
proposition that the technologies can be equivalently depicted in
terras of the underlying unit cost functions. Thus (2.1) and (2.2) can
be rewritten as
1 = C*(w*,R,p); 1 = C
u
(w,R,p); p = C^w.R) (2.4)
where p is the unit price of the primary resource in terms of the
numeraire commodity u, R is the international rental rate of capital
and w* is the wage rate in the North.
In order to understand better the effect of the changes in the
exogenous variables on the endogenous variables, we rewrite (2.3) in
terms of input-output coefficients. Let C. . denote the requirement of
the ith input per unit of the jth good, i = L,K,M and j = u,u*,z. We
then have
Cv X + C„ X -I- C X = K + K* = k: (2.3a f )Ku u Ku u Kz z
C* X* = L* (2.3b')
Lu u
CU X +C„X - X (2.3c 1 )Mu u Mu u z
With quasi-concave and linearly homogenous production functions,
each C. . is a function solely of input prices and is homogenous of
degree zero in all input prices.
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The first point to be noted about our equilibrium is that factor
prices (w*,R,p) are independent of endowments of capital and labor and
depend solely on w. This is simply the observation that (2.4) is a
system of three equations in three unknowns. Given w, R and p is
determined in the South which then determines w* in the North. Once
factor prices are determined, factor intensities are determined and
(2.3a') - (2.3c') can be used to determine the output levels X
,
u
*
X and X .
u z
As in a standard Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson (HOS) trade model,
changes in commodity and factor prices affect output levels through
changes in factor intensities. Towards this end, we differentiate
(2.3a') - (2.3c') to obtain, as in Batra-Casas [1976],
XM X + XM X « X - (XM CM +XM CM ) (2.5b)Mu u Mu u r Mu Mu Mu Mu
XT X = L* - X T CT (2.5c)Lu u Lu Lu
where a hat (") denotes a rate of change (e.g., < = d</<) and where X..
is the proportion of the total supply of the ith factor used in the
jth sector (e.g., X.. - C_ X /< - K /<).
Ku Ku u u
Since factor intensities are independent of factor endowments, the
effects of an increase in L* or < (K or K*) can be read off from the
simplified system
-6-
X
Ku
X
Kr
X
K,
Mu
*
/v M
u
X
u
<
*
~
X
Mu z
*
X L*
Lu u
(2.6)
Given our specialized North where labor is fully employed, an
increase in either Southern or Northern capital stock does not affect
the level of production of the manufactured good in the North. The
impact is only felt in the South where both X and X rise. Since X
u z z
is an input for X , a rise in X is naturally accompanied by a rise in
u u
X . Existence of surplus labor makes this overall expansion feasible.
*
An increase in L* however causes X to increase. This immediately
u
entails an inflow of capital and the primary resource into North. In
other words, direct foreign investment of North falls. As capital flows
out of the South, the level of production of X wni fall. Whether the
level of production of the primary resource will fall or not depends on
the extent to which resources released from a reduction in X is matched
u
by an increased demand from an expansion in X . Indeed X /L* = if
u z <
* * <
and only if K /M = K /M . In other words, if X is resource-intensive
u u > u u u
relative to capital, then a reduction in its production will release
*
more X than an increase in X can absorb. This will cause X to fall
z u z
*
and will release the additional capital which X requires. We summarize
u
the above analysis in the following Proposition.
Proposition 1
a) An increase in Southern or Northern capital increases output
levels of both commodities produced in the South leaving Northern
-7-
output unchanged. An increase in Northern labor supply increases
Northern output of commodity u but decreases Southern output of
commodity u. Production of the primary resource will increase
,
remain constant or decrease if and only if K /M = K /M .
- u u > u u
b) Any increase in Northern capital K* is invested totally in the
South, i.e., leads to an increase in K and K and leaves un-
2 2 u z
*
changed K . The same is true for any increase in Southern capital
stock K. An increase in Northern labor supply, however, leads to
a reduction in foreign investment by the North, i.e., increases
*
K .
—
u
As a standing hypothesis for the analysis to follow, we will
* *
assume that K /M > K /M . Given that the South is not as industrial-
u u u u
ized as the North, it seems to us reasonable to assume that the capital
intensity of its manufacturing sector cannot exceed that of North.
Under this hypothesis, it follows that the effective level of employment
in the South, L , will increase with an increase in k and decrease with
e
an increase in L*.
III. The Effects of Policy Measures on Factor Rewards, Output Levels
and International Capital Movements
In this section we analyze the impact of tariffs, export taxes and
profits taxes on the variables in our economy. Imposition of tariffs
by the South on the imports of the manufactured good can be justified
on the grounds of the standard "infant-industry argument." A similar
argument can be provided for the imposition of an export tax on the
primary resource by the South. Profits taxes imposed by the South on
repatriated earnings to the North is a standard policy prescription
and needs little justification.
-8-
Our analysis will revolve around equation systems (2. A) and
(2.5a) - (2.5c). In order to solve for changes in output levels
resulting from changes in factor prices, it is necessary to express
the change in each C. . in terms of input prices. Total differen-
tiation of any such C.
.
yields
C. = e..a?.w + 8„.ai.R + eM .aP,.p (3.1)ij Lj Li Kj Ki Mj Mi
where A., is the distributive share of the ith factor in the ith sec-
lj
tor and cr. is the partial elasticity of substitution between the ith
is
and the sth factor in the jth industry, i,s = L,K,M; j = u,z,u* and
w stands for w or w*. Since C. . is homogenous of degree zero in w*
,
R and p, it follows that
9
Lj°ii + Vii + Vmi = ° (3 - 2)
Combining (3.1) and (3.2) and noting that w is a constant yields
~* * U* A ~ * u* ~ *
Slu
= - 9
Lu LMP
+ 6Ku°m(R
- p)
SL = V^"*"*5 + "Ku m<R-P ) (3 - 3)
A, A At A.
C
Ku
=
-
9
Lu
aLK
R
"
9
MuaMK
(R"p)
A, At
C
Kz
= "B
Kz
aLK
R
X X iiX X X |jX
C
Ku
= 9
Lu
aLK
(w
"
R)
"
e
Mu
aMK
(R"p)
For the analysis to follow we assume all the partial elasticities
of substitution to be positive, i.e., that all factors are weak
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substitutes for each other. The signs of C. then depend on the direc-
tion of change in the factor prices with respect to the parameters.
a. Tariffs
Consider first a tariff that Resourcia might adopt in order to
protect its u-sector. Given our assumption that the Resourcian sub-
sistence wage is in terms of commodity u, an increase in a tariff has
to be compensated by a corresponding increase in the nominal wage
rate. Thus (2.4) has to be modified to
1 = C
u
(w*,R,p); (1+t) = C
u
(w(l+t),R,p); p = C
z
(w( 1+t) ,R,p) (3.4)
Totally differentiating (3.4) we obtain
* *
Lu Ku
*
*Mu
Q v 6mKu Mu
9
Kz -
1
w*
t(1- S
Lu>
- e_ t
Lz
which in turn yields R/t = p/t = 1 and w*/t < 0. The above results
can also be obtained if we choose the primary resource as the numeraire.
In this case we have
p = C (w*,R,l); p U+t) = C (wp (l+t),R,l); 1 = C (wp (l+t),R) (3.5)
Let us define in (3.5) p (1+t) e p . Then it can be rewritten as
p /1+t = C (w*,R,l); P - C (wp ,R,1); 1 = C (wp ,R) (3.6)
u u u uu zu
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The last two equations indicate that p and R are unchanged. With
an increase in t
, p is lower and so is w*. Thus, among other things,
an increase in Southern tariff does not alter the domestic price ratio
(or the internal terms of trade between manufactures and primary
resource) in the South. We thus have
Proposition 2
(a) With an increase in tariffs, the relative price of the primary
good in terms of the final good is unchanged in the South while in
the North the relative price of the primary good is higher .
(b) The real reward to Southern capital is unchanged while that to
Northern capital is lower .
(c) The real reward to Northern labor is lower .
Next, we turn our attention to the North. Suppose it imposes a
tariff t* on the import of the commodity u, or alternatively, an
export subsidy on the export of u. In this case only the first
equation in (2.4) changes to (1+t*) = C (w*,R,p) and we obtain
Proposition 3
An increase in a Northern tariff or export subsidy has no effect
on the price of the primary resource and on the rate of return to
capital but increases the Northern wage rate .
The above proposition will play an important role in the welfare
analysis to be presented later. We will observe that as long as the
South remains a labor-surplus economy, the North cannot exploit the
South with any quantity instruments.
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b. Profits Taxes
Consider next a tax imposed by the South on the earnings of foreign
capital. Let R be the gross rate of return earned by Northern capital
in the South and R* that earned in the North. If the ad valorem profits
tax is given by t, arbitrage requires
R* = R(1-t) (3.7)
*
and we can rewrite (2.4) as
1 = C*(w,R(l-t),p)
,
1 = C
u
(w,R,p), p = C
z
(w,R) (3.8)
The following result can be easily derived.
Proposition 4
An increase in the Southern profits tax leaves the price of the
primary resource and the gross rate of return to capital in the South
unchanged. The rate of return to capital in the North falls but the
Northern wage rises. Identical results are obtained for an increase
in Northern profits tax .
Thus, a Southern profits tax benefits Northern labor. The same is
true for a tax imposed by the North on the rental of that part of its
capital that is invested in the South.
c. Export or Import Taxes on the Primary Resource
A third set of instruments of commercial policy that we can con-
sider are taxes imposed on the export or import of the primary re-
source. Let v be an ad valorem tax imposed by the South on the export
-12-
of the primary resource. In this case, the first equation (2. A) is
changed to
1 = C*(w*,R,p(l+v)) (3.9)
and we obtain the following result.
Proposition 5
An increase in the export tax imposed by the South on the primary
resource leaves its price and the rate of return to capital unchanged
but lowers the Northern wage. Identical results are obtained in the
case of an increase in an import tax imposed by the North .
Batra-Casas [1976] have shown that changes in output levels due to
changes in factor prices depend on the ranking of factor intensities
among different sectors and on the extent to which factors of produc-
tion are substitutable. In our model, since the South is a labor-
surplus economy, the ranking of the two sectors there in terras of
capital-labor ratios is of no consequence for the analysis. Moreover,
since labor is internationally immobile, the ranking of the u-sector in
both North and South in terms of their capital-labor ratios also does
not enter the analysis. The only intensity ranking that appears in the
capital-primary resource ratio and we have already assumed K /M >
K /M as our standing hypothesis,
u u
As regards partial elasticities of substitution we will assume
that in both the North and the South, the extent of substitutability
between capital and labor is higher than that between labor and the
u u u* u* .
primary resource, i.e., a. „ > aTV( and a > aTVI . This assumption is
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also a natural one and brings out the essential importance of the
primary resource. It emphasizes the fact that the South, in spite of
having surplus labor, cannot significantly substitute away from the
primary resource towards labor with a change in the price of the former.
It should therefore encourage foreign investment. On the same ground
this also justifies Northern investment in the South. An extreme
assumption would be to treat the primary resource-output ratio constant
in both countries.
Equations (2 .5a)-(2 .5c) give us the effects of changes in factor
techniques on output levels and (3.3) gives us the relationship be-
tween changes in factor techniques and input prices. These combined
with Propositions 2 to 5, together with the above assumptions, will
yield the effect of various policy measures on output levels. In
particular we have
Proposition 6
Let (K* /M*) > (K /M ) , q"Tr > qT
U
w and af„ > qT
U*
.
1 u u u—u
—
-
—LK LM— LK LM
(a) An increase in a Southern tariff on good u, or a Southern export
tax on the primary resource or a Northern import tax on the primary
resource are all equivalent in that they increase X and X and2 u z
*
decrease X .
u
(b) An increase in a Northern tariff on good u, or an increase in the
profits tax imposed by either the South or the North leads to
changes opposite to those in (a) .
The economics of this proposition are straightforward. Consider,
for example, an increase in the tariff, t, imposed by the South. The
-14-
output of the protected sector, X , increases and thus leads to an
u
increased demand for capital and the primary resource. This requires
increased borrowing of foreign capital brought about by a fall in
X . Given our ranking of the factor intensities and our assumptions
on the partial elasticities of substitution, it is immediate that the
increased demand for the primary resource from the u-sector in the South
*
is not matched by resources released from a decrease in X and thus
u
leads to an increase in X . The effects of the other policy parameters
can be argued along similar lines.
The effect of policy measures on total employment in the South and
on international capital movements can also be derived from Proposition
6. We have
Proposition 7
Under the hypotheses of Proposition 6
,
(a) an increase in a Southern tariff on good u, or a Southern export
tax on the primary resource, or a Northern import tax on the primary
resource lead to an increase in Southern employment and to an in-
creased inflow of Northern capital to the South ;
(b) an increase in a Northern tariff on good u, or an increase in the
profits tax imposed by either the South or the North leads to
changes opposite to those in (a) .
IV. The Effects of Policy Measures and Factor Accumulation on Welfare
We can now bring together the results of Section II and III and
analyse the effects of commercial policy and factor accumulation on
welfare. Throughout this section we shall take the hypotheses of
Proposition 6 as our standing hypotheses.
-15-
In the first place we examine the effects of factor accumulation
in the presence of tariffs. Next we consider the effects of commer-
cial policies in the presence of foreign capital.
Since there is only one final good, Southern welfare is given by
the level of consumption of this good, where
Q = (l+t)X + p(X -M ) - R(K +K -K) + t(0 -X ) (4.1)
u uzu zu uu
The sum of the first two terms represents the value of national out-
put at domestic prices. The third term represents repatriation of
earnings of foreign capital and the last term represents tariff revenue.
Let us first consider the effect on of an increase in K and K*.
U
30 3X
On differentiating (4.1) with respect to K we obtain (1-t) = -rrr—
o K. o K.
the sign of which is positive. The economic rationale is as follows.
* * *
An increase in K does not increase X and thereby keeps M and K con-
u u u
y
stant. This implies that in (4.1), the change in the second term is
zero. Moreover, since all of the increase in K is retained in the
South, the change in repatriated earnings, that is the third term, is
zero. These, together with the fact that u is the only consumable good,
yield the above result.
With an increase in K* , however,
30 3X _3L 3M 3K
Given our assumption of a specialized North in which labor is fully em-
ployed, an increase in Northern capital flows into the South and there-
fore increases repatriated earnings from the South. Thus the gain in out-
put has to be weighed against this loss. A little simplification would
-16-
yield insight into the above formula. We know that K = C X . This
3K 3X Z *Z Z
z z * *implies that
-rrrr
= CT, . . Since X remains constant, M remains3K* Kz 3K* u u
constant and thus yields that 3M /3K* = 3X /3K*. The last two terms can
u z
now be simplified to
3M 3M
the sign of which is positive. Thus the increase in national product
net of repatriated earnings is positive. But the term -t3X /3K*
signifies a decrease in tariff revenues resulting from an increase in
domestic production. The change in Southern welfare then would depend
on whether the increase in value of national product is greater than
or less than the decrease in tariff revenue. If the initial position
is one of laissez-faire, i.e., t = 0, then Southern welfare rises
unambiguously
.
Northern welfare is also given by the level of consumption of com-
*
modity u, Q where
uAAA A A A
= X - pM + R(K +K -K) = X - pM + R(K*-K ) (4.3)uuu ru uu u
Changes in Northern welfare corresponding to changes in K and K* are
A A
given by 30 /3K = and 30 /3K* = R. Thus an increase in Southern
u u
capital does not affect Northern welfare, whereas an increase in
Northern capital is welfare-improving for the North due to an increase
in repatriated earnings from the South.
The welfare effects of an increase in the supply of Northern labor,
L*, can be similarly analyzed. We have (l-t)3Q /3L* = w3L /3L* - t3X
u
/3L*
and 30 /3L* = w*. Since 3X /3L* < and 3L /3L* < 0, welfare will
u u e
-17-
increase if the loss in total wages due to contraction is less than an
increase in tariff revenues. Welfare of the North necessarily
increases. We thus have
Proposition 8
a) An increase in the stock of Southern capital improves Southern
welfare, keeping the level of Northern welfare unchanged .
b) An increase in the stock of Northern capital improves Northern
welfare, but will improve Southern welfare if the increase in
national product net of repatriated earnings exceeds the decrease
in tariff revenues .
c) An increase in labor supply in the North improves Northern
welfare, but will improve Southern welfare if the increase in
/ tariff revenues exceeds the loss in total wages due to economic
contraction .
Next, we consider the welfare effects of a Southern tariff, t. The
change in Southern welfare is given by
3t U dt Z U dt Z U dt dt
It is clear that the result should depend on a combination of the
terms of trade effect, the direct effect and the repatriation effect.
The first two and the last terra represent the direct effect, the third
term gives the terms of trade effect and the fourth terra the repatria-
tion effect. With an increase in protection, Southern production ex-
pands leading to an increase in employment but a decrease in tariff
revenue. An increase in p increases its revenue from sales of the
-18-
interraediate good to the North, but an increase in the return to capital
increases repatriated earnings. If, on the other hand, South is an
exporter of capital, and we start from a zero tariff situation, then
South welfare necessarily rises.
The change in Northern welfare is given by
*
30
If the North is an importer of capital then Northern welfare falls.
But if it is an exporter of capital, then the change in welfare
depends on increases in capital earnings from abroad matched against
increased expenditure on the primary resource.
A similar analysis can be conducted for a Northern tariff t*.
Southern welfare is now given by (4.1) with t = and on differentiating
this, we obtain
3Q 3L
T-T " w ^r4 (4-6)St* 3t*
Northern welfare is given by
= (l+t*)X - pM* + R(K*-K ) + t*(0 -X ). (4.7)
u u u u u u
On differentiating this with respect to t* , we obtain
* *
30 * 3X
* * *
If we let E denote Northern imports (Q -X ) and n* the price elasticity
u u u
of demand of Northern imports, (4.8) reduces to the optimum tariff
formula
-19-
* *
30 E
U
Proposition 9
An increase in the Northern tariff decreases Southern welfare and
always increases Northern welfare from an initial position of laissez-
faire. Otherwise it increases Northern welfare if and only if
(Q*|E*) > n*.
u ' u
Next, we consider the effect of a tax v imposed by the South on the
export of the primary resources. In this case, Southern welfare is
given by
Q = X + p(l+v)(X -M ) - R(K +K -K) (4.10)uu zu zu
and Nothern welfare by
= X - p(l+v)M + R(K*-K ). (4.11)
u u u u
On differentiating (4.11), we obtain
*
30
—a-
-pm
3v Y u
which is negative without any additional hypotheses. On the other hand,
the differential of yields
u
30 3L 3L 3K 3M
tt - • it + ><W + "(w jt + E jr - p ir> (4 - 12)
On simplifying the above equation, we obtain
3Q wL
T^- e T + P(X -M )(l+n)3v v Lv v z u
-20-
where e and n are, respectively, the elasticities of Southern employ-
ment and Southern exports with respect to the export tax. If we let
9 and 9 denote the proportion of labor income and value of exports in
L h
Southern income, we obtain
30 9 T e t .u a -cc L Lv 1 .. N
-
— = iff v = - ,,,., g . (4.13)
3v 9_n (1+1/n)
Proposition 10
An increase in a Southern export tax on the primary resource
decreases Northern welfare. It increases Southern welfare from a
9
L
£
Lv 1position of laissez-faire and more generally, iff v > /,.., ,—r-.* s i-i q n (l+i/n)
It is worth pointing out that the value of v in (4.13) is none
other than the optimum tariff formula adjusted in our context to take
account of the fact that an export tax also increases domestic employ-
ment.
In the case of an import tax v* imposed by the North, we obtain
Q - X + p(X -M ) + R(K +K -K) (4.14)
u u z u z u
- X - p(l+v*)M + R(K*-K ) + pv*M (4.15)
u u u u u
which on differentiation yields
80 3L
-Ji-wr-r (4.16)
* *
3Q 3M
T-r - pv* t~ . (4.17)3v* v 3v*
-21-
Proposition 11
An Increase in a Northern import tax on the primary resource
decreases Northern welfare but increases Southern welfare .
Finally, we consider the consequences for Northern and Southern wel-
fare of a profits tax t imposed by the South. In this case, Southern
welfare is given by
= X + p(X -M ) - R(1-t)(K +K -K) (4.18)
u u z u z u
and Northern welfare by
= X - pM + R(1-t)(K +K -K). (4.19)
u u u z u
On differentiating with respect to t, we obtain
3Q 3L
-_£ = w __£. + R(K +K -K) (4.20)
3t 3t z u
*
30 A
•£—» -R(K*-K
u
). (4.21)
On appealing to Proposition 7, we can write
Proposition 12
(a) If South is a borrower of capital, an increase in the Southern
profits tax decreases Northern welfare and increases Southern wel-
fare if and only if (t/1-t) > (9T /9 ri )(-eT ) where 9. and 9„ areL K L T L R
respectively the shares of labor and repatriated earnings in
Southern income and e. is the elasticity of Southern employment
with respect to the profits tax .
(b) If South is a lender of capital, an increase in the Southern profits
tax hurts the South and benefits the North.
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The above result is easy to interpret. An increase in a Southern
profits tax affords a direct saving to te South in terms of repatriated
capital earnings (assuming it is a borrower of capital), but an outflow
of capital certainly reduces Southern output. An optimal profits tax
is one which would balance these considerations, modulo second order
conditions.
In the case of a profits tax t* imposed by the North, one simply
puts t = in (4.18) and (4.19). On differentiation of the resulting
equations with respect to t* , we obtain
3Q 30 9L
—4=0 and —Ji- W --|. (4.22)
On using the result in Proposition 7, we can write
Proposition 13
An increase in the Northern profits tax leaves Northern welfare
unchanged but decreases Southern welfare .
This result is simply a consequence of the fact that a Northern
profits tax just redistributes income from Northern capitalists to
Northern labor and our aggregate measure of welfare cannot catch this
effect. As regards the South, the inflow of foreign capital displaces
Southern labor and thereby decreases Southern welfare.
V. Commercial Policy with Two or More Instruments
Jones [1967] and Kemp [1969] have studied commercial policy in a
two commodity, two factor, two country world economy in which one of the
factors, capital, is internationally mobile. They have pointed out
-23-
that optimal policy by either country consists in that country exploit-
ing its monopoly power in both the product market as well as in capital
market. As such, an optimal policy requires two policy instruments
—
a tariff and a tax-cum-subsidy on capital. A natural question arises
as to how all of this fares in our North-South model of the world economy.
In this section we turn to this.
Begin with the North. Its objective function is given by
X (L*,K ,M ) - pM + R(K-K ). (5.1)
u u u u u
The first point to observe is that the optimal policy for the North is
*
one of laissez-faire if the only instruments available to it are K and
u
*
M . This is simply a consequence of the fact that p and R depend only
on Southern technologies and on the Southern wage rate. This fact also
precludes the North from using p and R as possible policy instruments.
However, as brought out in Proposition 11, an import subsidy by the
North on the primary resource increases, under our assumptions, North's
welfare and decreases that of the South. This is just the Kemp-Ohyama
result that "there is no limit to the extent to which the North can
'exploit' the South by the imposition of an export tax" with the only
qualification that instead of an export tax on the commodity u, the
North should use an import subsidy on the resource. This also high-
lights the fact that the North does not need two instruments for the
conduct of its commercial policy.
The situation for the South is somewhat more intricate. The objec-
tive function for the South is given by
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X (L ,K ,M ) = p(X -M ) + R(K +K -K) . (5.2)uuuuzu zu
The South can choose as its instruments of commercial policy K , K and
u z
M in the knowledge that through these it can affect p and R, given our
underlying assumption that the North's passive response is
* *
3X ax
p = —£ and R = —£ . (5.3)
3M 3K
u u
*
It may be noted that X is a function of L* , K + K* - K - K and
u u z
X (L ,K ) - M . The only variables which are unaccounted for are L
z z z u z
and L and these are determined in the South as a consequence of our
u
labor-surplus assumption.
3X 3X
TT"" and p -3T- =W - (5 ' 4)
u z
However, the above discussion has used three instruments of com-
mercial policy rather than two. If we are limited to only two, we
would have to impose the additional condition
3X 3X
1T = P "3lT • (5 ' 5)
u r
It is worth emphasizing that there is no rationale in our second best
context for (5.5)
.
A similar analysis can be conducted if the South is limited to price
instruments, say p and R. In this case (5.5) can be rewritten as
X (L ,K ,X (L ,K )-M ) + pM - R(K*-K ). (5.6)
u u u r r' r u u u
On differentiating this with respect to p and R, we can derive the
optimal policy for the South in terms of Northern responses 3K /3R,
-25-
£ £ £
3K /3p, 3M /3R, 3M /3p. Note that the values of L , L and K can beuuu uz z
obtained from the three constraints (5.4) and (5.5). K is given as
u
the residual K + K* - K - K .
u z
VI. Concluding Remarks
The basic thrust of this paper is the analysis of a labor surplus
economy but, of course, labor supply is never literally unlimited. It
is clear that with increased development or in terms of the language
of our model, with sufficiently pronounced changes in K or L*, South
may jump to the inelastic part of the labor supply curve. In this case,
terms of trade are no longer independent of factor endowments and our
conclusions need modifications along lines analysed by Kemp-Ohyama.
We leave such an analysis for the interested reader.
Our second remark relates to the question raised as to what labor
does in labor-surplus South when it is not producing either of the two
goods. One way out of this difficulty is to assume that it is engaged
in subsistence farming and the consequent loss of output recognized in
the expressions. However, to introduce the farming sector in a more
meaningful fashion would require an expanded model.
Our third remark relates to the fact that an increase in labor sup-
ply in the North raises Northern output but reduces that of the final
good in the South; and that a decrease in capital stock in either
country keeps Northern output unchanged but reduces that of both goods
in the South. These results are independent of any factor intensity
assumptions and eventually force the international economy to move out
of its cone of diversification. Put differently, these parametric
-26-
changes can force the South to specialize in the production of the
primary resource. It is of some interest to examine the qualitative
properties of such a model.
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Footnotes
In addition, see Findlay [1979], Lawrence-Levy [1982] and Tower
[1978].
2 *
We shall assume that F
,
F and F (below) are each twice contin-
u u z
uously dif ferentiable in each of their arguments with strictly diminish-
ing marginal productivities.
3
Ibid.
4
It is a simple consequence of Samuelson's Envelope theorem that
3C./8w. = L./X. and 3C./3R. = K./X.. Additional properties of the unit1111 1111 r r
cost function are that it is positively homogeneous of degree one in
its arguments and concave. On all this, see, for example, the
references in Mussa's [1980] paper.
The choice of u as the numeraire is also in accord with Kemp-Ohyama.
See Chipman's paper for references to the work of the other authors.
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